Financial dollarization by Ize, Alain & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
Quintas Jornadas de Economía
Monetaria e Internacional
La Plata, 11 y 12 de mayo de 2000
Financial Dollarization
Alain Ize (IMF) y
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (UTDT)
Financial Dollarization1
Alain Ize
International Monetary Fund
Eduardo Levy Yeyati
UTDT
Abstract
This paper presents a portfolio model of financial intermediation in which currency choice is
determined by hedging decisions on both sides of a bank’s balance sheet. Minimum variance
portfolio (MVP) allocations are found to provide a natural benchmark to estimate the scope for
dollarization of bank deposits and loans as a function of macroeconomic uncertainty. Dollarization
hysteresis is shown to occur when the expected volatility of the inflation rate is high in relation to
that of the real exchange rate. The evidence shows that MVP dollarization generally approximates
actual dollarization closely for a broad sample of countries. Policy implications are explored.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION
While substantial progress has been achieved during the last decade in controlling inflation
throughout the world, dollarization, the holding by residents of a significant share of their assets or
liabilities in foreign currency, remains a common feature of both developing economies and
economies in transition.2 In several developing countries that have experienced severe inflationary
experiences, particularly in Latin American countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru,
dollarization remains very high, notwithstanding several years of stable macroeconomic policies that
have gradually improved confidence (Figure 1). While dollarization trends in the transition
economies are somewhat more subdued, dollarization also appears to have become entrenched in
many cases (Figure 2). 
Although the literature on dollarization is very vast, it leaves some important gaps.3 While the
importance of macroeconomic expectations as a key determinant of the demand for dollar assets is
well recognized, few attempts have been made at systematically estimating dollarization levels across
countries, based on macroeconomic conditions. In addition, most of the literature is concerned with
currency substitution (i.e., the use of foreign currency as a means of payment), rather than asset
substitution (i.e., the use of foreign currency instruments for investment purposes). However, the
latter generally accounts for the bulk of measured dollarization.4 Moreover, the papers that
                                                
2The term “dollarization” is applied generically to the use of foreign currency assets and liabilities,
although in some cases the dollar is not the main foreign currency of choice of domestic residents.
3The dollarization literature is quite extensive and has grown rapidly in recent years. Recent surveys
can be found in Calvo and Vegh (1992 and 1997), Giovannini and Turtleboom (1994), and
Savastano (1996). Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) present a model of hysteresis based on switching
costs.
4Hence, as noted by many observers, much of the empirical literature is plagued by a definitional
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specifically address the issue of asset substitution as a portfolio choice generally do not recognize
the implications of dollarization for financial intermediation.5 Yet, the fact that the dollarization of
bank deposits generally has as mirror image that of loans is important to determine the nature and
extent of dollarization. In particular, the extent of loan dollarization determines the financial system’s
exposure to systemic credit risk in the case of large devaluations. Finally, while there is a general
presumption that dollarization restricts the scope for independent monetary and exchange rate
policies, the scope for altering dollarization through monetary and exchange rate policies has not
been well explored.
                                                                                                                                                            
problem, as interest bearing deposits are used to estimate money demand equations.
5See, e.g., Sahay and Vegh (1996). An exception is Ize (1981), on which this paper draws.
Following contributions by Thomas (1985) and others, this paper presents a model of asset
substitution based on a Capital Assets Portfolio Model (CAPM) formulation. However, unlike in
the earlier literature, currency choice is determined on both sides of a bank’s balance sheet by
hedging against inflation and foreign exchange risk. Thus, the dollarization of deposits and loans
interact through the loanable funds market. The paper shows that this interaction leads to financial
equilibria which gravitate around interest rate parity and minimum variance portfolio allocations
(MVP). Hence, MVP, which is found to be a simple function of the volatility of inflation and real
depreciation, provides a natural benchmark to measure underlying dollarization and relate it to
macroeconomic stability.
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In MVP equilibria, dollarization is explained by the second moments (i.e., volatility) of inflation and
real exchange rate depreciation, rather than the first moments (i.e., expected inflation and
depreciation), as in the case of currency substitution models.6 For a given variance of inflation, an
increase in the variance of the rate of depreciation reduces dollarization as it limits the hedging
benefits of dollar assets. Hence, stabilization may fail to reduce dollarization if accompanied by
policies that target the real exchange rate. This provides an alternative explanation for the
permanence of dollarization to the ones based on switching costs or long lasting memories. In the
model presented here, hysteresis can occur even when the memory of past macroeconomic
unbalances has faded away, if the expected volatility of inflation remains high in relation to that of
the real exchange rate.
The evidence seems to support this result as underlying dollarization, defined as the dollar share of
the MVP allocation, generally approximates actual dollarization closely for a broad sample of
countries. The empirical results are confirmed by a panel regression for five highly dollarized Latin
American economies, Argentina, Bolivia, México, Perú and Uruguay.
                                                
6These conclusions are reminiscent of those reached for Bolivia and Peru by McNelis and Rojas-
Suarez (1996) who conclude, on the basis of a similar CAPM approach, that dollarization is related
to devaluation uncertainty. However, the results in this study differ in that they focus on MVP
allocations, rather than deviations from MVP, and on asset substitution, rather than currency
substitution. Thus, while McNelis and Rojas-Suarez find that devaluation uncertainty promotes
dollarization, in our model underlying dollarization is correlated positively with the variance of
inflation but negatively with the variance of the rate of real depreciation.
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While this conclusion suggests that a floating exchange rate policy could, in principle, be used as a
means to limit dollarization (i.e., by increasing real exchange rate volatility relative to price volatility),
financial dollarization is also shown to be related to real sector dollarization, as measured by the
pass-through coefficient of exchange rate changes on prices. Hence, in highly dollarized economies,
it may not be possible to increase the volatility of the exchange rate, without increasing that of
inflation. This limits the feasibility of using exchange rate policy as a means to reverse dollarization. It
also implies that dollarization should be regarded, at least in part, as a natural consequence of trade
liberalization and international economic integration. Hence, attempts to limit it may be ill-advised in
those cases.
The paper briefly explores how actual dollarization can deviate from underlying dollarization. Based
on portfolio interaction between country risk (i.e., confiscation and banking system risk) and
macroeconomic risk (i.e., inflation and foreign exchange risk), dollarization and the structure of
interest rates are shown to depend on the volume of net foreign assets, the magnitude and currency
of denomination of public domestic debt (including the central bank’s domestic liabilities), and the
taxation of financial intermediation (e.g., through unremunerated reserve requirements). In particular,
capital inflows due to declining country risk, a tightening of monetary policy or a shift in the currency
composition of public domestic debt toward the domestic currency, increase the differential
between home currency and local foreign currency interest rates, thereby reducing deposit
dollarization while increasing loan dollarization. Instead, unremunerated reserve requirements on
foreign currency deposits can contain dollarization on both sides of a bank’s balance sheet, although
at the cost of capital flight and financial disintermediation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model and derives expressions for the
deposit and loan dollarization ratios as a function of MVP allocations and deviations from interest
rate parity. Section III presents empirical evidence of the link between actual and underlying
dollarization ratios. Section IV discusses the policy implications. Section V summarizes and
concludes.
II.   THE PORTFOLIO MODEL
A.   Depositors’ Portfolio Choice
Domestic depositors’ portfolios comprise three assets: domestically held home currency deposits
(HCD), domestically held foreign currency deposits (FCD) and cross-border foreign currency
deposits (CBD), with real returns in terms of the domestic price index expressed as r HD , r FD  and
r C , respectively. We assume that depositors are not allowed to short-sell deposits in any currency
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and, in accordance with the emphasis of this paper on asset substitution, rather than currency
substitution, that agents hold no cash.7 
                                                
7However, the results are identical when cash holdings are introduced. See Thomas (1985).
Due to foreign exchange rate risk, dollar deposits or loans (at home or abroad) are imperfect
substitutes for home currency deposits or loans. In addition, deposits held locally are imperfect
substitutes for deposits held abroad, because of country risk. The latter is assumed to incorporate
all sources of risk which are not strictly macroeconomic in nature. Thus, it includes confiscation risk,
as well as banking system risk. Although it would be reasonable to expect some correlation
between macroeconomic risk and country risk, these risks are assumed to be independent for
purposes of analytical tractability.
Thus, it is assumed that:
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where mp, ms and mc are disturbances associated with inflation, the real exchange rate, and country
risk, respectively, assumed to be distributed with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix [Sij],
and E is the expectations operator. In addition, it is assumed that:
                              Ssc = Spc  = 0                             (2)
Depositors' preferences are represented by:
UD = E(rD) - cD Var(rD)/2                         (3)
where rD is the average real return of the deposit portfolio, cD > 0 reflects depositors’ aversion to
risk and V is the variance operator. If lD is the share of total dollar deposits (including CBD) and G
the share of cross-border deposits in the deposit portfolio, familiar CAPM formulations are found to
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hold for total dollar deposits and deposits held abroad as a function of excess returns (Appendix I.
A):
lD = l* - d ID / (cD V), (4)
G = 1 -   dX /  (cD Scc) (5)
where:
V = Var(rHL - rFL) = Spp + Sss  - 2Sps , (6)
d ID and dX are the expected internal and external deposit rate differentials:
d ID = E(rHD - rFD), (7)
dX = E(rFD - rC ), (8)
and l* is the dollar share of MVP, which can be written as:
l* = [Var(rDH ) - Cov(rDH ,rDF )]/ Var(rDH  - rDF  ). (9)
We denote this share as the “underlying” dollarization ratio.
Thus, for a level of country risk such that lD > g,8 the choice of currency (as reflected in the dollar
share of deposits) depends only on inflation and foreign exchange risk, while the choice of location
(as reflected in the cross-border share of deposits) depends only on country risk.9 Moreover, as
country risk favors holding assets abroad, a positive country risk premium dX is needed to induce
depositors to hold FCD.10
                                                
8For sufficiently high levels of country risk, deposit dollarization may be determined solely by the
location decision, as the optimal share of (foreign currency) deposits abroad exceeds the desired
share of foreign currency deposits (g > lD ). In this case, the existence of small amounts of FCD
may be explained by pure transaction motives, independent of the portfolio selection decision.
9This follows from the assumption that country risk is uncorrelated with variations in the real
exchange rate and inflation rate.
10We implicitly assume that lD (alternatively, G ) Î [0,1]. Otherwise, under the no-short-sales
condition, the solution would be at one corner, and the ratio would not respond to small changes in
the volatility parameters.
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As nominal interest rates are assumed to be fixed during the life of the deposit or loan contract,
uncertainty about real rates of return arises only from price or exchange rate volatility.
Approximating s as e - p , where e denotes the rates of change of the nominal exchange rate,
underlying dollarization can be expressed as a simple function of the volatility of inflation and the rate
of real depreciation:
(10)
It can readily be checked from this equation that l* increases with inflation volatility, and decreases
with the volatility of real exchange rate depreciation (see Appendix I. B).11
                                                
11Appendix I.B also shows that a decline in the correlation between inflation and the real exchange
rate implies an increase in the correlation of asset returns, which reduces the scope for hedging.
Hence, it favors dollarization when inflation volatility is higher than real exchange rate volatility, as it
reduces the attractiveness of domestic currency assets as hedging instruments against real exchange
rate changes.
B.   Borrowers’ Portfolio Choice
Cross-border loans (CBL) are assumed to be intermediated by the local banking system, reflecting
the fact that in most developing and transition economies there exists an asymmetry of access to
foreign capital markets between deposits and loans. As borrowers only have access to local loans,
in dollars (FCL) or home currency (HCL), there is incomplete arbitrage between local and foreign
rates in the dollar loan market. Hence, local dollar loan rates can be above comparable foreign rates
adjusted for country risk. 
S2+S+S
S+S = 
sss
s*
ppp
pppl
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The representative borrower uses the loan to invest in a project with a known return in units of the
domestic price index.12 Hence, the real return on the project is riskless and the borrower’s problem
reduces to that of minimizing the risk-adjusted cost of borrowing. Denote lL  the dollar share of the
loan portfolio.  The borrower’s portfolio preferences are assumed similar to the depositor’s, with
the sign of the expected real interest payments inverted:
UL = -E(rL)  -  cL Var(rL)/2 (11)
where rL is the cost of the loan portfolio. The dollar share of the borrower’s optimal portfolio has
the same form as in the case of the depositor, with the real interest rate differential entering with the
opposite sign:
lL = l* + d IL / (cL V), (12)
where d IL  is the loan rate differential:
d IL = E(rHL - rFL). (13)
C.   Financial Equilibrium
In the absence of differential taxes on financial intermediation, the internal interest rate differentials
on deposits and loans should be the same.13  In this case, equations (4) and (12) readily imply that
deposit and loan dollarization ratios should always be on opposite sides of MVP, if not at MVP.
For example, starting from MVP, an increase in the domestic interest rate differential in favor of
home currency should increase the attractiveness of home currency deposits and lower that of home
currency loans, thereby reducing deposit dollarization below MVP and raising loan dollarization
above MVP. But suppose, in addition, that the economy is closed to capital flows. In this case, all
bank deposits should necessarily have bank loans as a counterpart. Hence, depositors’ and
borrowers’ portfolios should be identical. If banks maintain balanced open foreign exchange 
positions, it is then obvious that MVP is the only possible financial equilibrium. Thus, deviations from
MVP can only occur if the supply and demand of loanable funds do not coincide.14
                                                
12We implicitly assume a balanced current account, so that the share of tradables (alternatively,
dollar-priced goods) in the production basket is the same as in the consumption basket.
13The discussion in this section abstracts from the existence of public domestic debt or bank
reserves at the central bank, which may induce deviations from MVP. Both are discussed in Section
IV below.
14Note that an increase in devaluation expectations does not, by itself, induce more dollarization, as
it should only be reflected in an increase of the internal interest rate differential.  
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This can be formalized as follows. Assume that banks can borrow abroad, with X being their net
(dollar) foreign liabilities, and that their balance sheets reflect the equilibrium between the demand
and supply for loanable funds:
(1- g)D + X = L, (14)
where D and L denote total deposits (including CBD) and total loans, respectively. From which:
D - L = gD - X, (15)
In addition, if banks maintain balanced open foreign exchange positions, the home currency
component of their balance sheet may be written:
(1 - lD)D = (1 - lL) L (16)
Substituting equations (4), (12) and (15) into equation (16), setting d iD = d iL = d, and rearranging,
we obtain:
d = - V (1-l*) (gD - X) (cD cL ) / (cD D + cL L). (17)
In turn, combining (4) and (12), it can be seen that deviations from l* are symmetric:
cL (lL - l* )= d / V = cD (l* - lD), (18)
and, from (17), that they depend on the country’s net foreign position, gD - X.
Notice that lD and lL are affected by deviations from interest rate parity (d ¹ 0) in proportion to cD
 and cL, respectively. In particular, if borrowers are less risk averse than depositors because they
have better hedging opportunities at hand, loans are closer substitutes across currencies than
deposits. In this case, a change in the interest rate differential as a result of a change in the net
foreign position of the country should have a larger impact on the currency composition of loans,
than deposits. Moreover, as the difference in risk aversion increases,  cD / cL becomes arbitrarily
large, and the deposit portfolio closely approximates MVP even in the presence of an unbalanced
foreign position.15
D.  Real Sector Dollarization
                                                
15A limiting example is the case of risk-neutral borrowers (cL = 0), in which interest rate parity
always holds (d = 0).
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While a full discussion of the factors underlying real sector dollarization (i.e., the prevalence of dollar
pricing in price and wage contracts) falls largely outside the scope of this paper, linkages between
real sector dollarization and financial sector dollarization (i.e., the extent of deposit and loan
dollarization) can be usefully illustrated with a simple extension of the model. Suppose that inflation
and the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate evolve according to:
p  = ae + (1 - a)e , (19)
s = e - p  = (1 - a) (e - e) , (20)
where e represents real or monetary-induced price shocks to the domestic currency component of
the consumption basket and a represents the pass-through from the exchange rate to the price level
(alternatively, the foreign currency component of the domestic consumption basket). A high pass-
through could result from an open economy (i.e., a large tradable sector) or from dollar pricing of
non tradable goods.16 It can easily be shown, replacing (19) and (20) into (10), that l* can then be
expressed as:17
 
l* _ b = rep Sp / Se , (21)
                                                
16For simplicity, foreign inflation price shocks are ignored.
17 See Appendix I.
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which is the coefficient of a regression of the inflation rate on changes in the exchange rate,
i.e. a crude measure of the pass-through coefficient, a. Thus, real and financial dollarization
should generally be highly correlated. In part, this should reflect the fact that the factors underlying
the choice of currency in the pricing of contracts are likely to be similar to those underlying asset
substitution. But, in addition, real and financial dollarization should have a mutually reinforcing effect.
As reflected in (20), an increase in a raises l* by reducing the volatility of the real exchange rate,
hence increasing the attractiveness of dollar assets. In turn, an increase in l* promotes real
dollarization by limiting the scope for anchoring the price level through monetary policy.18  Such
interdependencies may also contribute to hysteresis, by slowing the speed at which de-dollarization
can take place in an economy that has stabilized.
III.   EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The empirical evidence suggests that actual dollarization ratios can be largely explained in terms of
underlying dollarization levels. Figure 3 compares actual dollarization with underlying dollarization
for a broad sample of countries covering industrial, developing, and transition economies. Actual
dollarization is defined as the ratio of total foreign currency deposits over total domestic and cross-
border deposits for the year 1995, or the latest observation available.19 Underlying dollarization is
derived from the expression of l* in equation (10). In the absence of forward-looking data on
inflation and real exchange rate expectations, the variance and covariance of these variables are
obtained from quarterly observed data over the period 1990-1995, or the longest period for which
meaningful data exists. The fit is highly satisfactory.
The relevance of MVP as a key explanatory factor of dollarization is confirmed by estimating a
regression of actual dollarization on underlying dollarization (Table 3). The table also shows how the
explanatory power of the rate of inflation, significant when taken alone, is substantially reduced
when underlying dollarization is included as a regressor.20 The importance of net external assets in
                                                
18 Such linkages between real and financial dollarization suggest that multiple equilibria could exist in
which the choice of currency and the extent of dollarization become indeterminate. In the context of
currency substitution, see the related discussion in Kareken and Wallace (1981) and the counter
arguments presented by Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994).
19 The list of countries and the period coverage are shown in Table 1. Table 2 provides a definition
of the variables used in the empirical estimates.
20Average inflation is computed using quarterly data for the same period used to compute underlying
dollarization.
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explaining deviations from MVP is tested by including a proxy for net foreign assets, NFA.21  The
coefficient is significant and has the expected sign.
                                                
21 Net external assets are computed as net external assets of the banking system plus CBD minus
CBL, over the sum of total deposits and loans, (gD - X)/(D+L), which is consistent with equation
(17) for the case in which the coefficients of risk aversion of depositors and borrowers are the
same. An alternativley proxy for the net external position of the country, (gD - X)/ L, broadly
consistent with the case in which cD << cL , was also tested with similar results.
Although the relation between underlying dollarization and its different components is not linear, the
signs of the coefficient on inflation and real depreciation volatility are, respectively, positive and
negative, as predicted by the model, and highly significant. The positive sign of the covariance term
is also consistent with the model when inflation volatility is higher than real exchange rate volatility.
The significant linkage between real and financial sector dollarization is illustrated in the second panel
of Figure 3 where, following equation (21), we estimate the pass-through coefficient b based on
data for the period 1990-1995, and plot it against actual dollarization values. The correlation
between the two variables suggests that financial dollarization is substantially affected by real sector
dollarization. This is confirmed by regressing the dollarization ratio on b  or its individual components
(the standard deviaton of inflation, the inverse of the standard deviaiton of the nominal depreciation
rate, and the correlation between these two variables). In both cases, coefficients are significant and
of the correct sign.
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Unfortunately, longer series for many of the dollarized economies in the sample are inexistent or
unreliable, so that the results obtained from the cross country comparisons cannot be tested using
panel data covering a longer period of time for all countries in the sample.22 However, the model
can be tested using panel data for a sub-sample of highly dollarized Latin American countries during
the past two decades.  Table 4 presents the results of panel regressions for a sample including
Argentina, Bolivia, México, Perú and Uruguay.23 The results closely resemble those in the previous
table. The inflation rate, measured as the average quarterly inflation over the past year, loses its
explanatory power once underlying dollarization is introduced.24 Net foreign assets are positively
correlated with dollarization ratios, and the individual components of l* display the correct sign.
Both the pass-through coefficient b  and its components present the correct sign and are highly
significant.
It is also interesting to test the model’s predictions for countries that have developed alternative
instruments to limit foreign macroeconomic risk, particularly price-indexed or interest rate-indexed
instruments. Abstracting from lags and other measurement problems, price-indexed assets are free
of inflation or currency risk. As long as indices can be found that follow purchasing power closely,
such instruments should dominate dollar-indexed instruments.25 Table 5 compares underlying
dollarization with actual dollarization and with the use of alternative indexing instruments for
countries in which price or interest rate indexation have been broadly used, such as Chile, Israel and
Brazil.26 As expected, predicted dollarization, as measured by l*, generally exceeds actual
                                                
22A particular important obstacle is the fact that in most cases, official data aggregate time, saving
and foreign currency deposits. 
23These five countries are the Latin American examples most often cited in the literature. Dummies
variables were used to control for country-specific effects.
24 The coefficient of inflation is still significant when combined with l*, but has negative sign.
25Notice that the development of alternative hedging instruments, such as foreign exchange
derivatives, and, more generally, the deepening of financial markets, including stocks, corporate
bonds and mutual fund shares, that allow for alternative ways to hedge against foreign exchange
risk, should also contribute to lessen the demand for dollar indexation. Indeed, the same risk
exposure can be achieved with local currency intermediation, coupled with a foreign exchange
futures market, as with bi-currency financial intermediation.  
26In Brazil, both price indexation and interest rate indexation have been broadly used. In particular,
the indexation of deposits to the overnight interest rate protected the purchasing power of HCD
throughout the turbulent period of the 1980's. In Chile, indexation has been facilitated by the
introduction in 1967 of a unit of account, the UF, that is published by the central bank daily on the
basis of the consumer price index. In Israel, a broad menu of indexed assets has been available to
the public, including CPI-indexed assets, dollar-indexed assets (PATZAM), and dollar deposits
(PATAM). However, the use of CPI-indexed assets has been mainly restricted to long-term time
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dollarization by a large margin.
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Exchange Rate Policy
The previous discussion indicates that l* increases with inflation volatility, and decreases with the
volatility of real exchange rate depreciation.  Thus, stable inflation and a fluctuating real exchange
rate should be associated with low dollarization. In particular, the combination of inflation targeting
(to the extent it reduces inflation volatility) with a floating exchange rate (to the extent it increases
real exchange rate volatility) should foster the use of local currency and discourage that of foreign
currency, since it reduces the risk associated with the former and increases that associated with the
latter. Instead, a stabilization policy that reduces inflation volatility, through lowering inflation, may
not succeed in reducing dollarization if it is accompanied by a stable real exchange rate. This would
be the case, in particular, if the authorities target the real exchange rate (for example, through a
crawling peg policy) rather than the inflation rate.
                                                                                                                                                      
deposits and saving deposits.
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A good example is found in Latin American economies, in which the dollarization ratio remained
high after stabilization, due to the fact that the decline of inflation volatility in the post-stabilization
period was offset by that of real exchange rate changes, as Figure 4 shows.27  Table 6 further
illustrates this idea by comparing periods before and after exchange-rate based stabilizations.28
While inflation fell significantly in most cases, actual dollarization continued to be high, reflecting the
evolution of underlying dollarization. This explanation of the resilience of dollarization, which can in
principle be generalized to economies that have implemented exchange rate-based stabilizations,
contrasts with that generally offered by the currency substitution approach, that emphasizes the
beneficial effect of low inflation on dollarization.29
At the same time, the linkage between real and financial dollarization raises an important caveat to
the finding that dollarization may be reduced by increasing the flexibility of the exchange rate regime.
Indeed, in a highly dollarized economy with a floating exchange rate, the high elasticity and instability
of money demand should result in a high volatility of the nominal exchange rate.30 However, in an
economy with extensive asset substitution, the linkage between real and financial dollarization that
underlies equation (21) suggests that a volatile nominal exchange rate would result in a more volatile
rate of inflation. Thus, the scope for affecting l* through the adoption of a flexible exchange rate
regime may be limited and the benefits of a decline in dollarization need to be weighed against the
costs associated with a more volatile inflation.
The correlation between real and financial dollarization also suggests that trade liberalization and
international economic integration should promote financial dollarization over time as they are likely
to result in rising l*’s. In this context, financial dollarization should be viewed, at least in part, as a
normal consequence of trade and financial integration. Hence, attempts to limit it may be ill-advised.
                                                
27Bolivia is particularly interesting because it is the only country for which dollarization has actually
increased after stabilization. In this case, underlying dollarization was bolstered by a de-facto
crawling peg policy that corrected for most past inflation.
28Values before the stabilization took place are computed from data for the preceeding five-year
period.
29That this explanation is not specific to Latin American economies is exemplified by the inclusion of
Hungary, for which the previous argument holds.
30This factor has been used to argue in favor of a pegged system when currency substitution is
extensive. See Girton and Roper (1981) and Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994).
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The model can, in principle, also be applied to the case of a pegged exchange rate peg with
imperfect credibility, e.g., in the case of a peso problem such that the exchange rate is expected to
collapse with a positive probability.31 While the expected volatility of the rate of depreciation can no
longer be inferred from backward-looking exchange rate data during the period of the peg, lingering
expectations of devaluation can still tilt portfolio preferences in favor of dollar assets. Hence, price
stabilization through a fixed exchange rate arrangement such as a currency board may deepen
dollarization than reducing it. On the other hand, with a fully credible peg, l* becomes
indeterminate, as Sss = Spp = - Sps. In this case, agents become indifferent in terms of portfolio
choice between the home currency and the foreign currency, and dollarization needs to be explained
through other factors.32
B.   Monetary Policy
From the discussion in Section II, it follows that dollarization can be affected in two ways. It can be
altered through measures that affect: (i) macroeconomic uncertainty, hence underlying dollarization;
or (ii) the domestic interest rate differentials, hence that deviate dollarization from MVP allocations.
The rest of this section focuses on the latter.
For this purpose, government assets need to be introduced. For simplicity, we assume that they are
held in the form of domestic and foreign currency reserves of commercial banks at the central
bank.33 Denoting total bank reserves as R, and defining defining lR as the foreign currency share of
bank reserves, equation (16) may be expressed, as:
                   (1 - lD)D = (1 - lL)L + (1 - lR)R                               (22)
which indicates that the dollarization of deposits is obtained as a weighted average of that of loans
and reserves.
                                                
31Lingering differentials between local currency and foreign currency interest rates in countries such
as Argentina and Estonia suggest that even currency board arrangements lack full credibility.
32Currency substitution may provide, in such cases, an alternative explanation for asset substitution,
as funds invested in term deposits or other financial instruments will eventually be spent. Hence, to
limit the need for currency conversion, agents may allocate the currency of denomination of their
investments in accordance with spending shares.
33The reserves may be required or free, remunerated or unremunerated.  Moreover, nothing of
substance would be altered in the model if the reserves were in the form of marketable central bank
or treasury securities.
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When the rate of remuneration of bank reserves is below market levels (as in the case of
unremunerated reserve requirements), lending rates deviate from deposit rates and the domestic
interest rate differential on the asset side of a bank’s balance sheet may differ from that on the
deposit side. Let rH and rF be the ratios of bank reserves to bank loans in home and foreign
currency, i.e.:
               rH = lRR  / lLL,                   
rF = (1 - lR)R  / (1 - lL)L,
and eH  and eF the shares of reserves that are not remunerated. If banks are competitive with zero
intermediation costs, intermediation spreads
may be expressed as:                                        
  
(23)
 
where ti , i = H, F,  are the implicit tax rates on home and foreign currency intermediation that
derive from unremunerated reserve requirements. In turn, from (23), we can define the differential
tax wedge  t˜  as:
 t˜ =  tF- tH = dLI - dD I . (24)
Substituting equations (4) and (12) into (22), using (24), and rearranging, deviations from underlying
dollarization can now be written as:
lD - l* = (cL /M) [(1-l*)(gD - X) + (lR - l*)R - t˜ L] (25)
lL - l* =  (cD /M) [- (1-l*) (gD - X) - (lR - l*)R - t˜ D] (26)
with:
M = cD L+ cLD.  (27)
These expressions indicate that, in the context of the model, monetary policy can induce deviations
from MVP through three types of wedges: (i) an external wedge, when changes in the overall stance
of monetary policy induce capital flows that lead to an unbalanced net external creditor position for
the country (gD - X ¹ 0); (ii) a public debt wedge, when the currency composition of bank reserves
deviates from MVP (lR - l*¹ 0); and (iii) a tax wedge, when financial intermediation in domestic
currency and foreign currency are not taxed at the same rates (t˜ ¹ 0).
t = )rE( =)r - rE( iiDi
ii
D
i
L er
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Assuming an MVP currency composition of bank reserves and no tax wedge, to eliminate cross-
term effects, a tightening of the monetary stance raises domestic interest rates, thereby increasing the
external spread and inducing a shift from CBD to FCD, i.e. a fall of gD and a worsening of the
country’s net creditor position. As reflected in (25)-(26), the inflow gives rise to an excess supply of
local dollars which depresses dollar rates relative to local currency rates, thereby reducing deposit
dollarization but raising loan dollarization. Hence, if aimed at reducing dollarization, a tight monetary
policy is unlikely to be successful. Besides being difficult to sustain on macroeconomic grounds, it
has a mixed impact on dollarization.
Similarly, a tight monetary policy that aims at limiting the macroeconomic impact of capital inflows
encourages loan dollarization. In this case, dollarization may be particularly acute as inflows, which
originally result from the decline in the country’s risk premium, are subsequently compounded by the
tightening of monetary policy. As illustrated by recent events in several Asian countries, the
prudential implications of such large loan dollarizations can be severe once the exchange rate
collapses.34
Attempts to reduce dollarization by introducing a public debt wedge, for example by shifting the
currency composition of public debt in favor of the local currency, are similarly bound to fail due to
their symmetric impact on either side of a bank’s balance sheet. As interest rates on the local
currency rise relative to the foreign currency, deposit dollarization declines while loan dollarization
rises.
Instead, when a tax wedge is introduced, the deposit and loan internal interest rate differentials
deviate from each other and move in opposite directions. Thus, a positive tax wedge (i.e., in favor
of home currency intermediation) reduces dollarization on both sides of a bank’s balance sheet.
However, by depressing the domestic foreign currency interest rate and, in turn, the external interest
rate differential, it stimulates capital flight and causes desintermediation.
A similar outcome would be expected when FCD or FCL are prohibited. By forcing depositors to
hedge exchange risk through CBD rather than FCD, forced conversions of FCD into HCD, as
occurred in Mexico (1982), Bolivia (1982), and Peru (1985), can reduce dollarization but at the
cost of provoking capital flight and financial disintermediation.35  In contrast, the removal of a ceiling
                                                
34It is also worth noting from equations (25) and (26) that phases of strong capital inflows induced
by a fall in country risk would be expected, in our model, to be associated with a decline in the
external spread and an increase in the internal spread, as the excess supply of local dollars drives
home dollar rates down in relation to local currency rates. This appears to be corroborated by the
recent experience of some heavily dollarized countries such as Peru and Bolivia (Ize and Levy
Yeyati, 1998).
35 The financial disintermediations were amplified in all three cases by expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies which resulted in sharply negative real local currency interest rates.  For a more
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on local currency deposit rates, whose impact should be broadly equivalent to that of the removal of
a tax wedge, can reduce deposit and loan dollarization while stimulating financial intermediation.36
V.     CONCLUSIONS
                                                                                                                                                      
complete description of these events and their impact, see Savastano (1992).
36 The main difference between a regulatory ceiling on deposit rates and unremunerated reserve
requirements is that, in the former case, banks, rather than the central bank, appropriate the benefits
of the higher intermediation margin.
This paper presented a portfolio model of dollarization in which agents hedge against
macroeconomic risk on both sides of a bank’s balance sheet. Due to the symmetry of portfolio
decisions, this interaction leads to MVP portfolio allocations in the absence of external, public debt
or tax wedges. Hence, MVP provides an important benchmark to relate financial dollarization to
macroeconomic policies and estimate the scope for dollarization quantitatively. A novel explanation
for dollarization hysteresis was offered, based on the relative variabilities of inflation and the real
exchange rate.
Several important policy implications were derived for countries that seek to limit asset substitution.
To reduce dollarization, countries should target inflation rather than the real exchange rate. In
practice, however, the scope for using exchange rate policy as an instrument to reduce dollarization
may be limited in heavily dollarized economies, due to a possible inconsistency between increasing
real exchange rate volatility and limiting inflation volatility. On the other hand, a tight monetary policy
that attempts to reduce dollarization by tilting the domestic interest rate differential in favor of home
deposits is bound to increase the dollarization of bank loans. This effect could be particularly large
when the tightening of monetary policy takes place in response to capital inflows, thereby raising
severe prudential concerns. Tax-based or regulatory policies, while more effective to reduce
dollarization, are likely to have substantial costs in terms of capital flight and financial
disintermediation.
The paper also suggested that, in view of the close linkages between real and financial dollarization,
attempts at slowing down financial dollarization can be particularly ill-advised when the latter reflects
- 21 -
real sector developments, including globalization and trade liberalization. In those cases, the
potential benefits of reducing dollarization should be compared with the welfare loss from limiting the
scope for currency risk hedging.
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DERIVATION OF THE MODEL
A. Depositors’ Portfolio
Defining xF ,  xC, and xH  as the portfolio shares of FCD, CBD and HCD, respectively, the reader
can readily check that, from (1)-(2), the first and second moments of the probability distribution of
portfolio real returns can be expressed, after substituting
 xH = 1- xF  -  xC, as:37
E(r) = x’w + rH (A.1)
and:
Var(r) = x’B x + 2C x +Var(rH) , (A.2)
where:  
and E is the expectations operator. Assuming that depositors' preferences are represented by:
                                                
37 We drop the superscript for notational simplicity.
,
),(
),(
)(),(
),()(
,
,
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-
=
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
---
---
=
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-
=
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
=
HHC
HHF
HCHCHF
HCHFHF
HC
HF
C
F
rrrCov
rrrCov
rrVarrrrrCov
rrrrCovrrVar
rr
rr
E
x
x
C
B
w
x
- 23 -
U = E (r) - cD Var(r) / 2 (A.4)
with cD > 0, the first order condition for a solution to the portfolio selection problem can be
expressed as:
-w/cD + Bx + C = 0 (A.5)
from which one obtains the optimal portfolio shares:
x = B-1 [-C + (1/cD) w ] = l* + (1/cD) B-1w (A.6)
where l* = -B-1C, characterizes the currency
composition of the minimum variance portfolio (MVP). It
can be shown, using (2), that:
(A.7)
where:
V = (Sss - 2Ssp + Spp) = Var(rF - rH), (A.8)
and:
|B| = Scc V. (A.9)
It is easy to check that (C1 - C2) = Scc , from which:
l*2 = (C1 - C2) V / |B| = 1 (A.10)
and:
l*1 = - 1 + C1 / V (A.11)
Moreover:
C1 = Cov(rH, rF) - Var(rH), (A.12)
which, combined with (A.6) and (A.7), yields: 
lD = xF + xC = l1* + l2* - (1/ cD |B| ) Scc (rH - rF) =
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ +=-
VV
VSV cc
B
B
11
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= l* - (1/ cD V) d ID , (A.13)
where:
l* = l1* + l2* = [Var(rH) - Cov(rH, rF)] / V. (A.14)
Finally, from (A.7):
xC = 1 + (1/ cD Scc ) [(rH - rF) + (rC - rH)], (A.15)
or:
xC = 1 + (1/ cD Scc ) dXD. (A.16)
B. Determinants of underlying dollarization
From (10), we know that:
(A.17)
It is easy to check that, for l* e [0,1]:
Sss + Sps > 0  (A.18)
and:
Spp + Sps > 0. (A.19)
Then, taking derivatives:
¶l*/¶Sss = -1/ (Spp + Sss + 2Sps)2  < 0, (A.20)
¶l*/¶Spp = (Sss + Sps) / (Spp + Sss + 2Sps)2  > 0, (A.21)
and:
¶l*/¶Sps = (Sss - Spp ) / (Spp + Sss + 2Sps)2 . (A.22)
From which:
]S2+S+S[
S+S = 
sss
s*
ppp
pppl
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sign (¶l*/¶Sps ) = sign (Sss - Spp ). (A.23)
C.  Impact of dollar pricing on underlying dollarization
It follows from (19) and (20)  that:
Spp = a2See + (1 - a)2 See +2 a(1 - a)See , (A.25)
Sss = (1 - a)2 (See + See - 2See) , (A.26)
and:
Sps = a(1 - a)See - (1 -a)2See + (1 -a)(1 - 2a)See. (A.27)
Replacing (A.25)-(A.27) into (A.17):
(A.28)
Finally, using (A.22), Sep = aSee  - (1 -a)See ,and (A.28) becomes:
l* = Sep /See  = rep Sp / Se . (A.29)
.
S
S)-(1+S = 
ee
eee* eaal
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TABLE 1
LIST OF COUNTRIES 1
 Albania 1992:2-1995
 Argentina
 Armenia 1993:2-1995
 Bolivia
 Bulgaria 1991:3-1995
 Canada
 Costa Rica
 Croatia 1993:2-1995
 Czech Republic 1993:2-1995
 Ecuador
 Egypt 1991:1-1995
 El Salvador
 Germany
 Guinea-Bissau
 Honduras
 Hungary
 Jamaica
 Japan
 Jordan
 Laos 1993:1-1995
 Malawi
 Mexico
 Mongolia 1992:1-1995
 Nicaragua
 Pakistan
 Peru
 Philippines
 Poland 1990:3-1995
 Romania 1991:1-1995
 Slovak Republic 1993:2-1995
 Turkey
 Uganda
 United Kingdom
 Uruguay
 Zambia
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1 Data available for the sample period used in the tests, except otherwise indicated.
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TABLE 2
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES
CBD = Cross border deposits (IFS).
CBL = Cross-border loans (IFS).
FCD = Foreign currency domestic deposits (IMF, 1998; Central Bank Bulletins, and IFS).
HCD = Local currency domestic deposits (Central Bank Bulletins, and IFS).
Dollarization ratio (lD)  = (FCD + CBD)/(FCD + CBD + HCD).
FA (FL) = Foreing assets (liabilities) of commercial banks (IFS).
CR = Total claims of deposit money banks (IFS).
D = FCD + HCD + CBD.
L = CR + CBL.
NFA = (FA - FL + CBD - CBL)/(D + L).
Sxy = Covariance of variables x and y computed based on quarterly data covering the previous 6
years (latest 24 observations). 
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TABLE 3
CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSIONS
p l* NFA Spp See Spe b Sp 1/Se rpe R2
(1) 0.309
(0.090)
0.190
(2) 0.619
(0.055)
0.802
(3) -0.120
(0.050)
0.690
(0.070)
0.820
(4) 0.614
(0.050)
0.169
(0.082)
0.815
(5) 0.284
(0.261)
0.010
(0.002)
-0.010
(0.004)
0.016
(0.004)
0.178
(6) 0.611
(0.087)
0.695
(7) 0.363
(0.145)
0.086
(0.043)
39.552
(16.140)
0.563
(0.085)
0.678
Number of observations: 35.  White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
Actual dollarization and net foreign assets (NFA) averages computed from annual data for the period 1990–1995. All other variables computed
from quarterly CPI and exchange rate data, and averaged over the period 1990 to 1995, or the longest period for which there is available data.
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 TABLE 4
LATIN AMERICA - PANEL REGRESSIONS (1982-1995)
p l* NFA Spp 1/See Spe b Sp 1/Se rpe R2
(1) 0.036
(0.015)
0.690
(2) 0.155
(0.023)
0.728
(3) 0.028
(0.015)
0.151
(0.023)
0.733
(4) 0.071
(0.021)
0.346
(0.044)
0.778
(5) 0.261
(0.039)
0.006
(0.001)
19.244
(6.239)
0.005
(0.002)
0.818
(6) 0.044
(0.012)
0.299
(0.039)
0.005
(0.001)
20.970
(6.202)
0.005
(0.002)
0.829
(7) 0.114
(0.025)
0.703
(8) 0.172
(0.019)
26.461
(4.296)
0.033
(0.024)
0.804
Number of observations: 280.  White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
Actual dollarization and net foreign assets (NFA) computed from annual data. All other variables computed from quarterly CPI and exchange
rate data.
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TABLE 5 
DEVIATIONS FROM MVP IN THE PRESENCE OF INDEXATION
Period MVP Actual1
Chile 1975:1 – 1985:3 57.6 36.2
1985:4 – 1996:3 32.0 14.2
Brazil 2 1980:1 – 1996:3 99.0 11.6
Israel 1980:1 – 1985:4 86.4 26.1
1986:1 – 1996:4 10.4 18.2
 1/ End of last year of corresponding period.
 2/ CBD only. FCD are not allowed in Brazil.
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TABLE 6
EXCHANGE RATE-BASED STABILIZATION AND DOLLARIZATION
Period Inflation rate l* Dollarization ratio
Argentina 1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
88.75
5.20
89.15
78.48
78.37
71.65
Bolivia 1985 - 1989
1990 - 1995
58.45
2.94
94.88
89.90
88.02
90.81
Mexico 1983 - 1987
1988 - 1995
17.45
5.95
49.46
28.72
44.62
33.30
Peru 1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
110.29
11.24
91.99
78.94
84.79
80.48
Uruguay 1986 - 1990
1991 - 1995
16.16
11.58
91.86
89.46
90.99
86.33
Hungary 1988 - 1992
1993 - 1995
5.67
5.44
37.67
43.21
23.96
39.95
Inflation rate computed as the average of quarterly inflation during the period. Dollarization ratios are
measured at the end of the period.
